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Reasoning strategies are a key component in many medical tasks, including decision making, clinical problem solving, and under-
standing of medical texts. Identiﬁcation of reasoning strategies used by clinicians may prove critical to the optimal design of decision
support systems. This paper presents a formal method of cognitive-semantic analysis for the identiﬁcation and characterization of
reasoning strategies deployed in medical tasks and demonstrates its use through speciﬁc examples. Although semantic analysis was
originally developed in the investigation of knowledge structures, it can also be applied to identify the reasoning and decision pro-
cesses used by physicians and medical trainees in clinical tasks. Assumptions underlying the methods, as well as illustrations of their
use in diagnostic explanation tasks, are presented. We discuss semantic analysis in the context of the current interests in developing
medical ontologies and argue that a frame-based propositional analytic methodology can provide a systematic way of addressing the
construction of such ontologies. Although the application of propositional analysis methods has some limitations, we show how
such limitations are being addressed and present some examples of information tools that have been developed to ease, and make
more systematic, the process of analysis.
 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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Clinical reasoning in medicine has been amply stud-
ied since the 1950s. From the beginning, diverse models
of reasoning in medicine have been proposed. Such
models have evolved from relatively simple associational
models [1], linking signs and symptoms with diagnostic
categories, to more elaborate structures that include
deduction, causal reasoning, and analogy making [2,3].
The complexity of clinical reasoning has been demon-1532-0464/$ - see front matter  2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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Patel).strated by studies covering diverse medical tasks, includ-
ing decision making [4–7], identiﬁcation of medical
errors [8–12], and comprehension of clinical information
[8,13–15]. These studies have shown that the types of
reasoning and strategies vary among clinicians; espe-
cially as a function of expertise [16], knowledge [17],
and problem diﬃculty [18]. One question that has arisen
is how to capture such complexity. In artiﬁcial intelli-
gence, methods of representing clinical reasoning have
been developed and used in the design of decision sup-
port systems. These include production rules, Bayesian
probabilistic methods, case-based reasoners, and deci-
sion tables, among others [1]. Similarly, cognitive meth-
ods of representation that uncover some of the actual
complexities of clinicians reasoning have been
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text [22–24], clinical guideline comprehension [25,26],
problem solving [27,28], decision making by health care
professionals [26,29,30], translation of text and diagram-
matic guidelines into computer interpretable representa-
tions [25,31], interpretation of errors in medication
instructions [15], and reasoning in problem-based
discussion groups [32].
The complexity of medical reasoning has also been
recognized in cognitive/epistemological models [2,3],
where the diagnostic process has been characterized in
terms of four types of inferences: abstraction, abduction,
deduction, and induction, seems to account for all as-
pects involved in diagnostic reasoning. The ﬁrst two
inference types drive hypothesis generation while latter
two types drive hypothesis testing. During abstraction,
data are ﬁltered according to their relevance for the
problem solution and chunked in schemas representing
an abstract description of the problem at hand (e.g.,
abstracting that an adult male with hemoglobin concen-
tration less than 14 d/gl is an anemic patient). Following
this, hypotheses that could account for the current situ-
ation are related through a process of abduction, char-
acterized by a ‘‘backward ﬂow’’ of inferences across a
chain of directed relations which identify those initial
conditions from which the current abstract representa-
tion of the problem originates. This provides tentative
solutions to the problem at hand by way of hypotheses.
For example, knowing that disease A will cause symp-
tom b, abduction will try to identify the explanation
for b, while deduction will forecast that a patient af-
fected by disease A will manifest symptom b: both infer-
ences are using the same relation along two diﬀerent
directions [2]. In the testing phase, hypotheses are incre-
mentally tested according to their ability to account for
the whole problem, where deduction serves to build up
the possible world described by the consequences of
each hypothesis. As predictions are derived from
hypotheses, they are matched to the case through a pro-
cess of induction, where a prediction generated from a
hypothesis can be matched with one speciﬁc aspect of
the patient problem. The major feature of induction is,
therefore, the ability to rule out those hypotheses whose
expected consequences turn out to be not in agreement
with the patient problem. This is because there is no log-
ical way to conﬁrm a hypothesis: we can only disconﬁrm
it in the presence of inconsistent evidence. This evalua-
tion process closes the testing phase of the diagnostic cy-
cle. Moreover, it determines which information is
needed in order to discriminate among hypotheses and
hence which information has to be collected.
In this paper, we present a review of these cognitive
methods for the analysis of clinical reasoning that have
been developed in the study of medical cognition. We
show how such methods capture the essential features
of the medical processes underlying diagnostic tasksand how they can have implications for the design of
medical decision support systems. We argue that appli-
cation of methods for the representation of clinical rea-
soning as used by clinicians may become an important
consideration in the design of decision support tools
that match the clinicians decision processes. In the fol-
lowing sections, we present a brief description of the
tasks that are used to elicit clinical reasoning and the
cognitive and ontological assumptions underlying such
tasks. Next, we present the basic methodology and the
types of information that can be gathered using the
methods in the investigation of medical reasoning. Fol-
lowing, we describe the empirical paradigm to investi-
gate and analyze reasoning in medical tasks, with
speciﬁc examples of the analyses of complex clinical
cases. Finally, we discuss some implications of the cog-
nitive methods to the study of decision-making and pro-
vide a glimpse of future research.2. Theoretical assumptions in medical cognition
In 1986, Patel and Groen [16] presented a methodol-
ogy for the investigation of reasoning and problem solv-
ing in medicine. Such methodology, propositional
analysis, was based on a theoretical understanding of
medical case comprehension [33], which, at the time
was novel to be used in a complex domain such as med-
icine. The interesting aspect of the method was that it at-
tempted to unite research areas that were thought to be
unrelated, namely, comprehension, problem solving,
and diagnostic reasoning. Medical artiﬁcial intelligence
was devoted to an examination of clinical problem solv-
ing using computational methods [34], such as rule-
based representations, to characterize signs, symptoms,
and diagnoses, when the use of propositional analysis al-
lowed the representation of knowledge needed in clinical
tasks, and provided a complementary methodology to
the methods based on production rules. Patel and
Groens aim was to isolate the reasoning process that
physicians go through when diagnosing a clinical case,
using techniques to identify knowledge structures. Their
research was motivated by two sets of ﬁndings. The ﬁrst
ﬁnding was that experts in domains outside medicine
reasoned from the problem data toward a hypothesis
that accounted for the data. The studies in medicine
pointed to a diﬀerent kind of reasoning by physicians:
reasoning from a hypothesis to account for the case
data, which seemed anomalous when compared to other
domains [35]. The second ﬁnding was that pure problem
solving response protocols, where a subject is simply
asked to ‘‘think aloud’’ as he or she makes a diagnosis,
tended to yield unsatisfactory or excessively sparse
information regarding the knowledge being used [23].
Hence, diﬀerent methods of data gathering and analysis
were tried that appear to solve both the contradictions
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aloud protocols. A promising method of data gathering
emerged, which was a type of probing task, known as
‘‘diagnostic explanation,’’ in which a physician or med-
ical student is asked to ‘‘explain the underlying patho-
physiology’’ of a patients condition. Unlike
conventional think-aloud, this task was shown to be
able to generate detailed knowledge used in problem
solving task. Explanations allowed researchers to con-
strain the task to generate manageable and relevant
information from the subjects. A similar methodology,
also for analyzing explanations outside of medical do-
main, has been developed by Chi [36–38], whose aims
and research results are consistent with those in medical
reasoning.
As the diagnostic explanation task can be used to
characterize knowledge structures in making diagnoses,
it can be used to identify the process indicators of rea-
soning where these knowledge structures are used.
Although the methodology has been described in vari-
ous papers over the years [39–41], there have been no
speciﬁc writings devoted to explaining its assumptions,
its logic, and limitations. This section presents a review
of the clinical explanation tasks, starting with a
description of the cognitive assumptions underlying
such tasks. Subsequently, we will present a theory of
comprehension and its use in understanding the pro-
cesses involved in diagnostic reasoning. We will ﬁnish
the section with a description of a model that provides
a framework for the representation of medical knowl-
edge in use.
2.1. Assumptions underlying explanation tasks
When providing an explanation related to a clinical
case, one can make some assumptions about the cogni-
tive structures and processes underlying such task. These
assumptions are based on cognitive research and theory,
which have been amply validated in the last 40 years. A
ﬁrst assumption is that information, such as a clinical
case description, is processed serially, at least at a certain
time-span, especially on tasks that require over a few
seconds to complete. When a clinical problem becomes
the focus of attention, the information generated passes
through working memory (WM) ﬁrst, and linked later
to information in long-term memory (LTM), which pro-
vides context that serves to ‘‘dis-ambiguate’’ the pro-
cessed information. For instance, the expression
‘‘breathing diﬃculty’’ may suggest a number of diﬀerent
scenarios, such as ‘‘exercise,’’ ‘‘asthma,’’ or ‘‘heart at-
tack,’’ to name a few. Depending on the task context
(e.g., diagnosis and treatment plan), these terms may
be diﬀerently associated in LTM. Seriality is important
because the ﬁrst information items that pass through
WM are the ﬁrst ones to activate knowledge in LTM,
which serves as a context for information processed la-ter. A second, related assumption is that the temporal
sequence in the explanation response protocol reﬂects
the temporality of the underlying reasoning. In other
words, those ideas or propositions that are verbalized
ﬁrst are thought ﬁrst, which is especially critical in
timed-tasks, where the clinician has no possibility of
revising the clinical problem (e.g., reading a case
description and providing an explanation in 3 min of
less [18]), or in online verbalizations, where the clinician
reasons while going through the clinical case (e.g., when
he clinician is asked to provide an explanation of a clin-
ical problem, a sentence at a time [17]). This assumption
is important for the investigation of diagnostic reason-
ing, where one can infer the nature of the cognitive pro-
cesses deployed in decision-making and problem solving
by looking at the temporal sequence of verbalizations. A
third assumption is that although the input information
may be ﬁxed (e.g., people read the same patient report,
physicians may observe the same patient), the processing
(e.g., reasoning strategies and inferences) and the output
(e.g., ﬁnal diagnosis or pathophysiological explanation)
are varied. In particular, cognitive research in medicine
[42] has shown that people generate representations of
clinical cases at several levels of generality, from the very
speciﬁc (e.g., as is often the case with medical students)
to the very general (e.g., as is true of expert clinicians).
The critical factor in determining generality is typically
the degree of high level expertise of the subject, namely,
specialized or speciﬁc expertise (i.e., knowledge of a par-
ticular sub-domain of medicine, such as endocrinology
or cardiology). Higher-level representations are gener-
ated by these more expert subjects, whereas lower-level
and more detailed representations are typically gener-
ated by novices, or more commonly, intermediate sub-
jects (e.g., senior medical students, recent graduates,
and residents) and sub-experts (i.e., experts who are
physicians by training, but do not have further special-
ized degree). A ﬁnal assumption is that the solution
strategies and the types of inferences used during clinical
problem solving are a function of domain-speciﬁc prior
knowledge that a person possesses [43], and more specif-
ically, of the quality and organization of such knowl-
edge [42] into adaptable and meaningful ‘‘schemata’’
or ‘‘frames.’’ In this paper, we use the terms frame
and schemata interchangeably to refer to learned knowl-
edge structures in clinicians knowledge-base that allow
them to identify prototypical or familiar clinical patient
problems in an eﬃcient manner, encompassing both
declarative (e.g., a diabetes frame, which includes the
features that identify the disease) and procedural infor-
mation (e.g., a physical examination frame which de-
scribes the typical events involved in examining a
patient). In the case of medicine, such frames or sche-
mata are organized in a manner that resemble closely
the layered structure of biomedical knowledge [44], as
it has been shown in research in medicine [42,45–47]
Fig. 1. Ontological model for clinical problem solving.
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cessing theories of comprehension provide a scientiﬁc
basis for knowledge organization and the acquisition
of expertise.
2.2. Assumptions in the generation of cognitive
representations
Given the importance of knowledge in decision-mak-
ing, the formation of a good problem representation is
crucial in generating correct and eﬀective decisions.
Developing a problem representation involves organiz-
ing knowledge into meaningful structures in memory.
Such memory structures include the salient aspects of
the information (e.g., gist, summary, major case charac-
teristics) and the context needed for its interpretation
(e.g., from memory of previous readings or patients
seen) [52]. Comprehension research suggests that such
‘‘meaning construction’’ is not a one-time deal, but a
cyclical process of building a sort of mental model by
keeping in memory some ideas about the case or prob-
lem and, gradually, albeit quickly, discarding others as
new information is gathered about the case [42,53]. This
process becomes more eﬃcient as clinicians experience
with patients increases. They acquire a great deal of spe-
ciﬁc knowledge (e.g., signs, symptoms, and medical pro-
cedures), which gets stored in LTM. However, as a
result of their practice, clinicians learn to associate indi-
vidual items in WM with the contents in LTM, which re-
sult in the development of conceptual organizations in
memory called retrieval structures [54,55]. This way,
an expert can use these retrieval structures to provide
selective and rapid access to long-term memory. For
example, a physician may be able to diagnose a patients
problem by recognizing a pattern of clinical ﬁndings as a
whole and associating them with a particular diagnosis
stored in LTM, which precludes the need to process each
clinical ﬁnding separately. In contrast, a novice looking
at the same patients signs and symptoms may see a col-
lection of independent ﬁndings, each of them linked to
diﬀerent diagnoses in memory.
Retrieval structures play a particular role in ﬁltering
irrelevant information in WM (irrelevant to a speciﬁc
problem) and reinforcing relevant associations. Re-
search [9,42,47] has shown that although novice and ex-
pert clinicians build their patient representation in a
similar way (e.g., by generating associations between
generic knowledge in LTM and speciﬁc patient ﬁndings
in WM), only the latter are capable of quickly and eﬃ-
ciently integrating such information into retrieval struc-
tures by: (a) ﬁltering irrelevant information and (b)
consolidating the problem-relevant information into a
coherent representation [17,42]. Using timed tasks
(e.g., under 3 min) and sequential presentation of expla-
nation tasks on a computer (e.g., presenting a clinical
case one segment at a time), it was possible to obtaina trace of the comprehension process that leads to the
generation of retrieval structures.
An assumption of our research is that there is a cor-
respondence between peoples structures in memory and
the structures in their domain of expertise. In the medi-
cal case, such correspondences are made between the
concepts and categories that clinicians generate and
use during clinical problem solving and the way the do-
main of medicine is organized. A conceptual framework
[19,27,44] that can be seen as an ontological model of
clinical diagnosis in the medical domain and which cor-
responds with the manner in which clinicians think
about diagnostic problems is presented next.
2.3. An ontology of medical knowledge in diagnostic tasks
The processes of comprehension and diagnostic rea-
soning (i.e., inferences, procedures, and strategies) are
carried out on the biomedical knowledge base possessed
by the clinician. In the case of diagnostic reasoning, the
biomedical knowledge can be described as an ontology
with multiple layers of concept types and various rela-
tionships in-between that serves to describe diagnostic
reasoning as a process of abstracting case information
from diﬀerent ontological levels. This ontology was ﬁrst
proposed by Evans and Gadd [27] as a form of providing
classiﬁcation of medical knowledge for use in problem
solving situations, and has been used extensively in med-
ical cognition research [42,47]. This model is presented in
Fig. 1. The ontology is composed of levels of knowledge
where the higher levels subsume or provide a context for
interpretation of the lower levels. The most basic level is
the empirium, which corresponds to the basic descrip-
tions of sensory data and carries no medical interpreta-
tion, such as anatomical descriptions or skin color [27].
The next level is composed of observations, which are
perceptual categories that serve as basis for clinical clas-
siﬁcation, and therefore require medical knowledge to
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a radiological image or distinguishable heart sounds,
which may be imperceptible to an untrained eye or ear,
are interpreted as observations by a physician. The next
level is composed of ﬁndings, clusters of observations
that are interpreted in terms of their clinical relevance,
such as when shortness of breath, for instance, is inter-
preted in the context of myocardial infarction. The next
is the level of facets, representing sub-diagnostic catego-
ries that suggest potential diagnoses (e.g., cardiovascular)
and discard some others (e.g., pulmonary). The level of
facets in the ontology is related to the concept of retrieval
structures in memory. Similarly to retrieval structures,
facets capture patterns of ﬁndings as whole concepts.
For instance, categorizing a cluster of ﬁndings (e.g., chest
pain, sweating, and faintness) as a facet, e.g., ‘‘cardiovas-
cular problem,’’ serves to explore a particular subset of
diseases while discarding others. The next following level
is that of diagnoses, which are clinical categories with
more or less known explanatory and therapeutic models.
The ﬁnal level is global complexes, which are the circum-
stances that aﬀect a particular patient, such as particular
age groups or patient characteristics that may inﬂuence a
diagnosis or a management path.
Within the framework of such an ontology of medical
knowledge, diagnosis can be considered as a narrow-
down search process [56,57] in the space of possible dis-
eases that account for the clinical manifestations. The
ontology integrates: (1) the space of diseases (the level
of facets and the level of diagnoses), (2) the space of clin-
ical manifestations (the level of empirium and the level
of observations), and (3) the constraints to search, such
as the contextual or causality relationships between dis-
eases and clinical manifestations (the level of ﬁndings)
and the speciﬁc condition of a patient (the level of global
complexes). At the beginning, with little data collected,
only a limited number of search constraints can be ap-
plied, and thus the space of the potential diagnoses is
large. For example, a patient reporting abdominal pain
may have appendicitis, pancreatitis, gastric ulcer, or
other diseases that lead to the symptom. As more data
are obtained through assessments (history data, physical
examinations, lab tests, etc.), additional constraints can
be applied, and thus the space of the potential diagnoses
is narrowed down, until the remaining diagnoses can ac-
count for the clinical ﬁndings appropriately. If a patient
with abdominal pain presents additional clinical ﬁndings
such as no fever and black stools without taking speciﬁc
medications that can account for it, it may indicate a
bleeding ulcer. In fact, here the general medical knowl-
edge of speciﬁc diseases and their manifestations provide
a framework for the diagnostic reasoning on a speciﬁc
case. This approach to knowledge organization and rea-
soning is also used in the design and implementation of
clinical decision support systems [58]. It is important to
note that the search for potential diagnoses from theclinical ﬁndings is a parallel process similar to pattern
recognition [59] rather than a sequential process like
the rule-based deduction [60]. The ontology described
previously is assumed to represent the structure of med-
ical knowledge required for diagnosis. However,
depending on the stimulus material (e.g., verbal case
presentations or real patient interviews), the type of case
(routine or non-routine), and the expertise level of the
diagnostician one wishes to model (e.g., expert, sub-ex-
pert, or novice), some of the strata in the ontology
may be omitted. For instance, when analyzing experts
diagnostic problem solving on routine cases, we can as-
sume that LTM items are limited to propositions repre-
senting knowledge of ﬁndings, facets, diagnoses, and
global complexes. Prior research has shown that in such
cases, the diagnostic reasoning is mostly bottom up,
with most inferences being forward-driven (data-driven)
toward the diagnosis [42]. Furthermore, when diagnostic
tasks are presented in the form of written patient
descriptions, there is already some information encoded
as ﬁndings in the description itself. This is analogous to
using such medical tasks, such as consultation with an-
other clinician, as stimulus material. In this case, the le-
vel corresponding to empirium is not present, because
the patient description is already interpreted in some
way in terms of observations or ﬁndings. In the next sec-
tion, we illustrate the use of such methods to determine
the reasoning and inferential processes in medical diag-
nostic tasks.3. Methods for identifying solution strategies in clinical
problem solving
In this section, we provide a detailed description of the
methods as they have been used to identify the process of
reasoning in medical tasks. The application of the meth-
ods has been spanned over a broad range, encompassing
empirical studies of expert-novice diﬀerences in medical
problem solving, cognitive representation of clinical
guidelines, use of diagrammatic guidelines in patient
management, and patients representations of illness,
among others [8,14,15,25,26,41,42,61,62]. We start the
section with a description of the empirical paradigm typ-
ically used in cognitive studies of medical diagnosis. We
then present some of the analyses that are carried out in
the investigation of reasoning, such as recall-inference,
directionality of reasoning, problem solving strategies,
and the identiﬁcation of reasoning errors. We close the
section by providing speciﬁc examples in which the de-
scribed methods are applied.
3.1. Empirical paradigm
In diagnostic explanation tasks, physicians are
asked to explain the pathophysiology of a patients
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quest, physicians typically respond by accounting for
the patients signs and symptoms in terms of potential
diagnoses, and not in terms of their underlying disease
mechanisms. In other words, clinicians respond by
clinically accounting for the patients signs and symp-
toms without explaining their disease mechanism. De-
spite the ‘‘shallowness’’ of clinicians response, the
diagnostic explanation is a probe that is extremely
useful in providing a rich account of a patients con-
dition during clinical reasoning. The empirical para-
digm used in diagnostic explanation task usually
consists of the following steps: (1) present a descrip-
tion of a clinical case, often in written form, and
ask the subjects to read it; (2) obtain a ‘‘free-recall’’
protocol by asking them to remember from memory
everything they can about the case, usually without
looking at the case; (3) ask the subjects to provide a
pathophysiological explanation of the clinical case,
where they elaborate the underlying pathology related
to the problem; and ﬁnally (4) ask the subjects for a
ﬁnal or a diﬀerential diagnosis. Note that the diagno-
sis is the last step in the process and this diagnosis
provides the opportunity of obtaining a response pro-
tocol that reﬂects the major elements of the diagnostic
solution process, giving also a somewhat detailed ac-
count of the patients condition. For the purpose of
identifying the solution strategies used by physicians
during clinical decision making, the explanation task
has been successfully used in the last 20 years by a
number of investigators [5,18,29,40,63]. The protocol
analysis has two main goals: (1) to characterize the
knowledge in use during clinical problem solving and
decision making (through the use of propositional
analysis); and (2) to identify the solution strategies
used in solving the patient problem and determining
the directionality of the subjects underlying reasoning
(using semantic network representations). Such process
involves the transcription of the data from verbal re-
sponse protocol, segmentation of the transcribed data
into a set of clauses, and analyzed using propositional
analysis. Relational structure between these proposi-
tions reﬂect the macrostructure of the protocol. In
the remainder of this section, we will walk the reader
through this process.
3.2. Propositional and semantic network analysis
A propositional representation provides a formal
means to explicitly identify ideas and the relationships
among these ideas in the form of a list of propositions;
where a proposition is an idea unit underlying the sur-
face representation of a text (e.g., a clinical case) or,
more precisely deﬁned, an n-ary relation among con-
cepts. Verbal protocols, either in written or spoken
forms, can be propositionally analyzed using any oneof the several systems of propositional analysis that have
been developed [33,64,65]. Despite some diﬀerences in
notation and details, all these systems provide a uniform
classiﬁcation format for the coding of verbal data, based
on the theoretical assumption that propositions corre-
spond to the basic cognitive units of knowledge repre-
sentation in human memory [66]. Although for a
diﬀering view see [67].
3.2.1. Propositional representations
Among the several propositional grammars that
have been proposed, we used Frederiksens model in
our research [14,40,68]. A characteristic of this model
is that it provides a generic semantic markup system,
which follows a syntax speciﬁed in the BNF notation,
and includes a number of semantic categories that
serve to mark propositions in terms of their ontology
and the frame-based relations among concepts and
propositions. In the analysis of clinical reasoning, the
most common relations are dependency relations, spe-
ciﬁcally, causal, conditional, temporal, and Boolean
connectives, such as alternating-OR and exclusive-OR
relations. Algebraic relations (e.g., greater than), iden-
tifying relations, and categorical relations (i.e., category
membership, part-whole relations) are also much used,
as well as those serve to identify the source and the re-
sult of a process. Uncertainty is typically represented
qualitatively by using modal qualiﬁers (e.g., can, might,
and may). The extent of use of semantic codes is pri-
marily determined by the detail of the representation.
As more detail is added, the likelihood of using a high-
er variety of codes also increases. In previous research,
we described how propositional analysis methods can
be used to uncover the semantics of clinical guidelines
[14] and the use of guidelines by medical practitioners
[26].
3.2.2. Coding of inferences
When physicians and other health professionals work
on a clinical problem, they make inferences that are
based on their prior knowledge. To identify these infer-
ences, methods of propositional analysis have proved
very useful in the past. A distinction is made between
a recall (the literal reproduction in the verbal protocol
of a proposition in the clinical case) and an inference
(any proposition in the verbal protocol that has not lit-
eral match in the clinical case). That is, whenever there
are transformations made by subjects on any message
base (e.g., the clinical case), it is scored as an inference.
This scoring procedure is based on a set of rules for
proposition matching and for proposition transforma-
tion according to speciﬁc transformation rules. For in-
stance, consider the original sentences: ‘‘If hemoptysis,
persistent cough, then examine the tracheal bronchial
tree.’’ and a physicians recall of the information: ‘‘If
hemoptysis, persistent cough, then examine for malig-
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segments is as follows:
Text Segment:
1.1 COND: (if) [hemoptysis, 1.2], [1.3];
1.2 cough = ATT: Persistent;
1.3 examine OBJ:[1.4];
1.4 tree ATT: tracheal, ATT: bronchial;Recall Segment:
Rl.l COND: (if) [hemoptysis, R1.2], [R1.3];
Rl.2 cough = ATT: Persistent;
R1.3 examine THM:[(for)R1.4];
Rl.4 malignancy LOC:(in) lungs;In comparing these two analyses, Proposition 1.2 is
identical to Proposition Rl.2. This would be classiﬁed
as a recall in our system. On the other hand, Proposi-
tions 1.1 and R1.1 are diﬀerent in that there is a change
in the consequent slot of the proposition. This is classi-
ﬁed as a conditional inference with a consequent change.
Furthermore, there is a replacement of a concept ‘‘tra-
cheal bronchial tree’’ in the proposition slot by a new
superordinate concept ‘‘lungs.’’ This inference involves
an operation on propositions in the text that results in
new propositions more general than the propositions
in the original content of the text; in this case, a part-
whole relationship between the clinical description and
the physicians protocol.3.3. Identifying reasoning through semantic network
representations
Network representations constitute common ways to
represent knowledge structures used in problem solving
and decision making. Such networks consist of the
graphical depictions of concepts and propositions that
allow to display their inter-relations, something that is
not possible with a propositional representation, which
is simply an ordered list. Several forms of network rep-
resentations have been developed and applied to the
analysis of medical knowledge, ranging from concept
maps [69] to conceptual graphs [70]. In general, most
network representations can be expressed in graph-theo-
retic terms [71]. Basically, a graph is a type of represen-
tation composed of nodes and directed arcs (also known
as edges or paths) connecting the nodes. A minimal
graph consists of two nodes and a single arc connecting
the nodes. Nodes may represent clinical ﬁndings, patho-
physiological processes, or diagnostic hypotheses,
whereas the arcs represent directed connections between
nodes. A network representation provides a means to
identify three aspects of clinical reasoning: (a) the over-
all strategy used in evaluating the collected clinical data,
(b) the directionality of the inferences used in reasoning;
and (c) the coherence of the diagnostic explanation.3.3.1. Directionality of inferences
We can determine the directionality of the inferential
processes in reasoning by looking at the directions of the
arcs in a network. A distinction is made between the
information that is given to the reasoner and the infor-
mation that is inferred or hypothesized from the infor-
mation given. Forward-driven reasoning corresponds
to a path from the given information—typically a clini-
cal ﬁnding—to a hypothesis (e.g., a diagnosis). In con-
trast, backward-driven reasoning corresponds to a
path that, starting in a hypothesis, ends in the informa-
tion given [72]. A pure chain of forward-driven reason-
ing refers to a network where all directed paths go
from data to hypothesis, whereas pure backward-driven
reasoning refers to a network where all paths go from
hypothesis to data. Cognitive research has shown that
pure forward-driven reasoning is typical of experts clin-
ical problem solving and reasoning [16,73].
3.3.2. Coherence in explanations
Explanatory coherence can be also assessed from the
semantic network representation. Coherence is deter-
mined by establishing the inter-relationships among
the nodes in a graph. Two forms of explanatory coher-
ence are often distinguished: global and local. A net-
work exhibiting global coherence is characterized by
connections among all nodes of the network without
any contradictions or loose ends. In turn, local coher-
ence refers to the consistency in a component of an
explanation that accounts for a part of the clinical prob-
lem. An explanation that exhibits local coherence, with-
out global coherence, would include isolated
components of the problem that are not explicitly linked
to the rest of the explanation. Cognitive research in
medicine has shown that global coherence is more com-
mon of the expert clinicians, while local coherence is
more often observed in less-than-experts clinicians.4. Applications of semantic analyses
To illustrate the application of semantic network
analysis we will use texts (e.g., case descriptions) that
serve as stimulus material as well as verbal reports by
health care providers in a variety of tasks. These include
explanatory accounts of clinical cases, physicians and
nurses recall of clinical summaries, physicians descrip-
tions of clinical guidelines, and representations of
sources of errors in diagnostic explanations. Applica-
tions of these methods of analysis to other types of med-
ical tasks and further example of the application of the
methods are provided elsewhere [14,39,40,42]. In clinical
diagnostic tasks, the ﬁrst step is to develop a model of
the task that is being investigated. This model functions
as a reference point indicating a standard of perfor-
mance to which explanation protocols are compared.
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representation that is constructed with the assistance of
domain experts and relevant medical information (e.g.,
textbooks, research literature). The process to build a
reference model is similar to a knowledge engineering
task used in expert systems research [74]. The goal is
not to develop a faithful cognitive representation of an
expert case model, but to construct an ideal, somewhat
abstract, model of the problem. Building a reference
model is an iterative process that includes eliciting infor-
mation from an expert to explain the ﬁndings in a case
(using knowledge elicitation techniques) and consulting
other sources for additional information such as to have
an explanation that is as complete as possible (for the
purpose of the clinical task). Once the content of the ref-
erence model is completed, a propositional representa-
tion is constructed from which a reference network is
developed.
The propositional and network representations of the
reference model serve to describe all the concepts neces-
sary for a complete, albeit idealized, solution to the pa-
tient problem (We will not present a reference model in
this paper, although the reader can ﬁnd examples else-
where [16,75]). The reference model, sometimes referred
to as canonical model, contains elements of the clinical
problem together with the minimum number of rules
leading to the correct diagnosis. In research studies, a
written case description is used as a clinical problem,
although real or simulated patients can be used. The
problem is presented to the clinician, who is asked to
reason out-loud and to provide a diagnosis as well as
an explanation for the case after the diagnosis. Illustra-
tion of a clinical problem is shown below:
A 62-year-old male lifted a box resulting in a sudden
onset of severe retrosternal chest pain radiating through
his back/ The pain persisted for 2 hours/ He felt a mild
shortness of breath/ The pain persisted at rest and with
movement/ He had a long history of hypertension/ and
also had a myocardial infarction 5 years ago/ He had no
history of recurrent pain/ and no shortness of breath onTable 1
Propositional analysis of sentence ‘‘A 62-year-old male lifted a box resulti
through to his back’’
Prop. # Predicate Argument
1.1 Lift AGT:male;OBJ
1.2 Male ATT:62-year-o
1.3 Pain LOC:chest;
1.4 COND:(result) [1.1][1.3];
1.5 Pain ATT:severe;
1.6 Pain ATT:sudden;
1.7 Chest PRT:(retostern
1.8 Go_through THM: 1.3,LOC
Column one of the table gives the proposition number; column two presents t
column four presents an explanation of each proposition in plain English. C
AGT: agent; ATT: attribute; COND: condition; LOC: location; OBJ: objecexertion/ He had no previous surgery/ On physical
examination, his blood pressure was 170/90/ His tem-
perature was 37 C/ His pulse was 110/min/ and his
respiratory rate was 30/min/ There were no abnormali-
ties on physical examination/
The ﬁrst step of analysis involves the segmentation of
the clinical case into major clauses and minor clauses,
according to Winograd [76]. Segmentation and the num-
bering of clauses are performed to make the analysis eas-
ier to perform. A sentence such as ‘‘He had a long history
of hypertension and also had a myocardial infarction 5
years ago,’’ could be segmented into two clauses: (1) /
He had a long history of hypertension/, and (2) /also
had a myocardial infarction 5 years ago/. Once the whole
text is segmented into clauses, the propositional analysis
can be performed by identifying the action of each
clause; typically represented by a verb. For instance,
the ﬁrst sentence in the text description (A 62-year-old
male lifted a box /and felt a sudden onset of severe retro-
sternal chest pain radiating through his back) consists of
two phrases and eight idea units or propositions, as given
in Table 1. The propositional analysis of the whole case
description, presented in Appendix A, resulted in 28
propositions. The propositional analysis provides the
following information: (1) the proposition number; (2)
the predicate; and (3) the argument. Semantic tags are
used in the arguments to codify the meta-content of the
text. For instance, AGT: indicates agent of the action;
ATT: indicates a property; OBJ: indicates the object of
the action (non-living); PAT: patient of the action (liv-
ing); LOC: location; PRT: part; THM: theme of feeling;
and COND: indicates conditionality. Aside from this
semantic information, generating a list of propositions
also provides a measure of the amount of information
that is provided in the stimulus text.
By comparing the information in the clinical case
description with the clinicians account of the case, one
can answer questions about the amount of information
that clinicians need to accurately diagnose the case;
what information is already in the clinicians knowledgeng in a sudden onset of severe retrosternal chest pain going through
Explanation
:box; Male (agent) lifts a box (object of lifting)
ld; Male (agent of action 1.1) is 62-years old
Pain is located in the chest
Lifting box was a condition for feeling pain
Pain is severe
Pain was sudden
al); Pain is felt in retrosternal part of chest
:back; Pain goes through to the patients back
he head element or predicate; column three presents the arguments; and
odes listed in the argument column indicate semantic tags as follows:
t; PRT: part; and THM: theme.
Table 2
Propositional analysis of a physicians verbalization of the clinical case
Prop. # Predicate Argument
1.1 Have PAT:Male,THM:Pain;
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problem; and how coherent is the clinicians explana-
tion. An explanation of the clinical problem provided
by a clinician is given below:1.2 Male ATT:62-yr old;
1.3 Pain LOC:Chest;
1.4 Chest PRT:(Retrosternal);
1.5 Pain DEG:Severe;
1.6 Pain ATT:Sudden (MODQUAL:very);
1.7 Radiate THM:Pain,LOC:Back (POSS:his);
1.8 Lift AGT: [1.2],OBJ:box;
1.9 EQUIV:TEM:(while) [1.8],[1.3];
The ﬁrst physician verbalization is ‘‘We have a 62-year-old male who
had a very sudden onset of severe retrosternal chest pain that radiated
through his back while lifting a box.’’ Argument tags listed in the
argument column indicate the following semantic constructs: AGT:
agent; ATT: attribute; COND: condition; DEG; degree; LOC: loca-
tion; OBJ: object; PAT: patient; PRT: part; EQUIV:TEM temporal
equivalence of events; THM: theme.
Fig. 2. Network representation of propositional representation of
sentence ‘‘A 62-year-old male lifted a box resulting in chest pain.’’We have a 62-year-old male who had a very sudden
onset of severe retrosternal chest pain that radiated
through his back while lifting a box. The pain was there
for two hours and persisted while the patient was mov-
ing or at rest. He has a history of hypertension and car-
diac problems, which suggests that this could be a case
of cardiovascular disease, such as ischemia, either
angina or even infarction. Hypertension makes me think
also of aortic dissection, especially with the pain radiat-
ing to the back and the isometric eﬀort. If he had a small
dissection, and he made this eﬀort, this could raise his
blood pressure and that can cause aortic dissection.
The fact that the pain was so sudden and that it was
there with movement or at rest is very consistent with
aortic dissection, but makes ischemia less likely. It could
be musculoskeletal also but with the history of hyperten-
sion and previous cardiac problem, it is less likely. On
physical examination, his blood pressure was 170 over
90, his pulse was 110, so hes tachycardic, his tempera-
ture was 37 C, and his respiratory rate is 30 per minute.
This suggests to me that there is something really serious
with this man and Im concerned with bleeding some-
where. Im going vascular now, with dissection of the
aorta, with this presentation, and with that pain radiat-
ing to the back, a musculoskeletal problem is less likely
right now.
The explanation provided by the clinician is also ana-
lyzed into propositions, which are then compared to the
propositions in the original clinical problem (As can be
seen in Appendix B, the physician generated 34 proposi-
tions). Such comparison functions as the basis for the
analysis of reasoning inferences and to determine the
amount of information used during problem solving.
As an illustration, Table 2 presents the propositional
analysis of a physicians verbalization of the text seg-
ments presented in Table 1. The two tables show that
the verbalization of the physician follows very closely
the information presented in the clinical text. The major
diﬀerence between them is that while the text states that
the chest pain was the result of lifting the box (RSLT:),
the physician interprets this information in terms of the
concurrency of the act of lifting the box and the feeling
of the pain (EQUIV:TEM). Diﬀerences in interpretation
such as this may indicate diﬀerences in the way the pa-
tient problem is constructed.
The translation from the propositional analysis to the
network representation is carried out by linking propo-
sitions through proposition overlap. For instance, if two
propositions have the same concept (e.g., lift box causes
chest pain and chest pain is central), they are linked in
the network and because typically propositions includea concept more than once, the network linked through
the common concepts. As seen in Fig. 2, the physicians
explanation, represented in network form, connects to-
gether all propositions, reﬂecting a coherent explana-
tion. Thus, the network is constructed by linking all
the propositions in the proposition list, with a triplet
(node-link-node) in the network representing a single
proposition (predicate-argument) in the propositional
analysis (sometimes, for the sake of simplicity, it is often
desirable to represent two or more propositions as a sin-
gle triplet in the network representation).
4.1. Domain frames and clinical tasks
Clinical cases are typically presented in a pre-speciﬁed
sequence of information, which include presenting com-
plaint, medical history (personal and familial), physical
examinations, and lab test results. In studies of clinical
reasoning, such sequence of information have been
called ‘‘frames,’’ as they function as generic structures
that help gather and organize clinical information. In
medical cognition research, such frames have been used
to organize concepts that clinicians use during problem
solving and to help researchers in comparisons between
clinical case representations of practitioners at diﬀerent
levels of expertise. It is typically expected that physician
and medical trainees follow such clinical diagnostic
frames, although showing diﬀerences as a function of
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mation is presented in random order [77], expert clini-
cians are able to re-organize such information into a
logical sequence reﬂecting a typical clinical frame (i.e.,
presenting complain, medical history, physical examina-
tion, and laboratory results).
In the procedure for identifying the clinical frames
used by clinicians, the ﬁrst step is to establish the stan-
dard medical task (e.g., diagnosis and management)
and to describe the prototypical components of such
tasks [32] (e.g., procedural steps and potential actions).
The representation of the typical clinical problem in
terms of such components serve as a comparison to
the actual representation of the problem by individual
clinicians. In the case of the clinical interview frame,
these consist of main complain, personal medical his-
tory, physical examination, and laboratory results. Part
of such a frame can be observed in the larger boxes of
Fig. 3, which provides a network representation of an
explanation of the clinical case presented above.
This expert explanation follows closely the diagnostic
procedural frame, which is typical of clinical interviews.
In this case, the protocol by the expert physician shows
three major components of the diagnostic frame (in the
larger boxes of Fig. 3): presenting complaint (ﬁrst box
on top), patients medical history (middle box), andFig. 3. Semantic network representation of clinical case by an expert physi
hypotheses, and unframed terms indicate non-diagnostic hypotheses. Black
relations.physical examination results (bottom box). As is typical
of experts, the network developed from the physicians
explanation is fully coherent in that all nodes are con-
nected. This contrasts with situations where a case
explanation is broken into components, which is typical
for novices. Similar results have been reported in other
domains [78–80].
4.2. Identiﬁcation of directionality of reasoning
As described above, in a semantic network, a forward
or data-driven inference is represented by a directed link
from the data given in the case description to a hypoth-
esis, whereas a backward or hypothesis-driven inference
is represented as a directed link from a hypothesis to-
ward the information in the case description. Fig. 3 also
shows that this physician generated hypotheses about
the likely diagnosis by inferencing from the data given
in the text (words within ovals) toward the diagnoses
(words within grey boxes). Thus, the overall direction
of the experts explanation is forward. In the ﬁgure, we
can identify 14 forward-directed inferences, which are
deﬁned as any link that starts in a piece of data (oval)
given in the case description toward a hypothesized con-
cept, such as a general problem (e.g., vascular problem
and ischemia), indication of an bodily internal problemcian. Oval terms indicate case data, grayed boxes indicate diagnostic
lines represent positive relations while grayed lines represent negative
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(e.g., aortic dissection and myocardial infarction). Any
piece of data may be used to generate more than one
forward-directed link. For instance, hypertension_histo-
ry is linked to both ischemia and aortic_dissection,
resulting in two forward-driven inferences. Notice that
not all links are directional. For instance, attribute
(ATT:), association (ASSOC), temporal (TEM:), and
thematic (THM:) links have no directionality. The
majority of the directed links are those tagged as condi-
tional (COND:), causal (CAU:), temporal (TEM:), and
resultive (RSLT:) relations.
No backward-driven inferences are observed in this
experts protocol. These would be reﬂected in links going
from a hypothesized patient state to accounting for the
case data, as it is illustrated in Fig. 4. The ﬁgure repre-
sents a clinical case where the patient is tachycardic,
has fever and low blood pressure, and has a toxic-look-
ing appearance. The protocol, from which the network
was developed, is from a physician who provided an
inaccurate diagnosis and whose expertise falls outside
the case area. These data are accounted for in terms of
causal events not given in the description. Furthermore,
the underlying mechanism that explains the signs andFig. 4. Semantic network representation of clinical case by a physician
showing the use of backward reasoning from a hypothesis (Drug_in-
jection) to account for the case data (Flame_shaped_hemorrhage).
Grayed boxes indicate diagnostic hypotheses, and unframed terms
indicate non-diagnostic hypotheses.
Fig. 5. Representation of directionality of reasoning by generated propositi
inferences involving horizontal relations within a single level of the ontology
forward-driven inferences (e.g., ﬁnding–facet and facet–diagnosis); and down
ﬁnding–observation).symptoms in this patient is attributed to toxicity of a
drug, which, according to the physician, results from a
reaction to stress.
As the use of backward reasoning involves hypothe-
sizing an internal pathophysiological processes and then
accounting for the data in terms of such hypothesized
mechanisms, backward-driven explanations are often
causal, and the links that relate the mechanisms to the
actual case data are typically coded as causal (CAU:).
To quantify the amount of forward-driven and back-
ward-driven reasoning in an explanation, one can count
the number of inference paths in a network, where each
inference is determined by deﬁning the starting point
and the ending point of each inference line. For instance,
Fig. 4 shows three backward reasoning paths, all start-
ing from the node termed ‘‘stress.’’ The ﬁrst reasoning
path includes all concepts that end in ‘‘shock_state’’
(i.e., drug injection, tachycardia, fall in blood pressure,
and high temperature). The second reasoning path goes
through ‘‘drug injection’’ and ends in ‘‘toxic state.’’ The
third reasoning path includes the concepts on the line
that starts from ‘‘stress,’’ goes through ‘‘drug injection’’
and ‘‘increased BP,’’ and ends in ‘‘ﬂame shaped
hemorrhage.’’
4.3. Ontology levels and length of inferences
Aside from the amount of directional inferences in a
protocol, another useful measure of a clinicians perfor-
mance is the ontological length of the inferences. This
measure can be generated from the superposition of
the ontological model described in Section 2.3. To iden-
tify the length of directionality of reasoning using the
ontological model, we note that lower levels of the onto-
logical model (i.e., observations and ﬁndings) corre-
spond to facts in a clinical case (e.g., as present in the
propositional analysis of the text description). Infer-
ences from each of these levels to the higher levels canons within the ontology model. Symbols across the zero line represent
model (e.g., ﬁnding–ﬁnding and facet–facet); upward arrows indicate
ward links indicate backward-driven associations (diagnosis–facet and
Table 3
Relationship of text segments from participant summaries to EMR
Chart 3
Text
segment
Relationship to chart
(R=recall, I=inference,
UC=uncoded)
MD summary
1.1 43-year-old white female R
1.2 who developed diarrhoea I
1.3 after a brief period of a
couple days of GI upset
I
2.1 She has been having
diarrhoea for about 5 days
R
2.2 of 15–20 times a day R
3.1 She has become volume
depleted
I
4.1 She needs to be rehydrated UC
5.1 There is no evidence of
anything more
serious than a gastroenteritis
I
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contrast, any inference that departs from a diagnosis
or facet toward facts can be construed as backward-
directed.
Fig. 5 provides a representation of the forward (data-
driven) and backward (hypopthesis-driven) inferences
identiﬁed in the physicians protocol (and the network
in Fig. 3). An inference may involve a simple proposition
(conceptﬁ concept) or a complex proposition (two or
more simple propositions linked into a chain). In the ﬁg-
ure, the 0 line represents the starting point of the infer-
ence; an upward line represents a forward-driven
inference; that is, a reasoning chain that starts from a con-
cept lower in the ontology to a concept higher in the ontol-
ogy (e.g., from observation to facet). A downward line
would represent a backward-driven inference (e.g., from
ﬁnding to diagnosis). There were no backward-driven
inferences in the physicians protocol. The distance be-
tween the 0-line and the arrow head indicates the number
of ontological levels covered by an inference. For in-
stance, a line going from level-0 to level-3 might represent
an inference going from an observation (level-0) to a facet
(level-3). The ﬁgure shows that this subject generated 20
forward-driven inferences, 14 same-level inferences, and
no backward inferences. Of the 20 forward-driven infer-
ences, 10 involved one level links (e.g., ﬁnding–facet and
observation–ﬁnding), 9 were 2-level inferences (e.g., ﬁnd-
ing–diagnosis, observation–facet), and 1 was a 3-level
inference (observation–diagnosis).5.2 due to either bacterial or
viral etiology
I
6.1 There is no treatment UC
RN summary
1.1 This is a 43-year-old white
female
R
1.2 who presented with
abdominal pain
I
1.3 that she said started 5 days
ago
R
2.1 At ﬁrst she was having 5
formed stools per day
I
2.2 which increased up to 15–20
three days ago
R
2.3 with watery diarrhoea R
3.1 She also noticed blood in her
stool
R
4.1 on physical exam everything
seemed normal
I
4.2 except her bowel sounds R4.4. Generation of inferences from patient summaries
A study conducted to investigate how physicians and
nurses read and interpreted patient summaries from elec-
tronic medical records provides an example of the use of
semantic analyses to evaluate inference generation in
clinical tasks. The example presented here involved the
comparison of summaries of a patient chart generated
by a physician and a nurse. To capture the complexity
of the summaries generated by the participants, proposi-
tional analysis was generated to identify ideas expressed
by the participants that were either literal recalls of the
chart or inferences. Since inferences represent an idea
that is generated from the information given in the text,
they are considered to be a higher level of thought [42].
The chart presented the following information:were hyperactive
4.3 and her stools were guaiac
positive
R
5.1 No medications were
prescribed
R
6.1 CHEM 7, CBC with
diﬀerential was ordered
R
6.2 and she was not placed on
any med
R
7.1 Final diagnosis:
gastroenteritis
RThis 43-year-old white female developed cramping
abdominal pain 5 days ago with associated increase in
frequency of stools, up to 5 per day (normal for her
was 1/day). The abdominal pain was relieved by the
passing of stools, which were formed. The episodes
increased in number, to approximately 15–20/day,
becoming watery 3 days after the onset of symptoms.
She developed tenesmus yesterday and noted the pres-
ence of red blood and mucous in the stool last evening.Prior to the onset of the abdominal pain, she said she
felt like she had a slight fever (did not take her temper-
ature) and felt ‘‘sore’’ all over. The patient denies any
recent travel out of the country.
The text segments of the participants summaries of
the electronic medical records (EMR) were compared
to the original text in the chart. Propositions were iden-
tiﬁed as being direct recall of the original text, inferences
generated from the original text, or uncoded informa-
tion that was not present in the original text. Table 3
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generated by a physician and a nurse. Half of the text
segments in the physicians summary consisted of infer-
ences, 30% were recall and 20% were uncoded. In con-
trast, most of the text segments (79%) in the nursesFig. 6. Network representation of a summary of a patient chart
generated from a physicians recall.
Fig. 7. Network representation of a summary of asummary were direct recall and 21% were inferences.
These results suggest that the participants summaries
were both quantitatively and qualitatively diﬀerent, gi-
ven that the physician mainly drew inferential informa-
tion and the nurse mainly recalled literal information
from the EMR summary.
Other diﬀerences in the participants summaries are
also illustrated in the network representations of the
texts, as seen in Figs. 6 and 7. Fig. 6 illustrates the sum-
mary produced by the physician whereas Fig. 7 repre-
sents the network from a nurses explanation. The
semantic representation of the physician involves a rela-
tively simple and coherent structure focusing on the
cases underlying causal and conditional relationships
(inferences made). In contrast, the network representa-
tion of the nurses summary involves a more complex
structure, which focuses on the restatement of the infor-
mation directly recalled from the original chart (literal
recalls). This suggests that the physician possessed a
model of the case that is based on deeper relationships
whereas the nurse focused on the descriptive surface as-
pects of the summary.
4.5. Error identiﬁcation in clinical reasoning
Eﬃcient clinical reasoning about a disease process re-
quires minimizing the number of variables that must be
held in memory in order to decrease cognitive load. For-
ward-driven and backward-driven reasoning strategies
have two diﬀerent functions: backward reasoning is con-
sistent with predictive reasoning from hypotheses to
observables, whereas forward reasoning is equivalent
to diagnostic reasoning from observables to hypotheses.patient chart generated from a nurses recall.
Fig. 8. Schematic representation of cyclical inference.
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because one can entertain a hypothesis of suﬃcient
power and generalization to account for many possible
manifestations. In this case, uncertainty is controlled be-
cause inference is limited to what is entailed by the
hypothesis (as in deduction). For example, if a physician
assumes that a patient has bacterial endocarditis, he or
she can know that an infectious process is involved
and, hence, can predict (and account for) associated
ﬁndings, such as fever. In contrast, in diagnostic reason-
ing there is more diﬃculty in controlling and eliminating
uncertainty. For instance, a physician could associate fe-
ver with infection, diagnostically, but it would be impos-
sible to say which type of infectious process was
involved without considering combinations of other
ﬁndings. Fever not only occurs during an infection,
but may also be present in inﬂammatory disorders and
in certain cancers. In diagnostic reasoning, from speciﬁc
manifestations to possible hypotheses, a physician may
introduce numerous alternatives that must be reconciled
against one another. A non-expert physician, who may
not be able to easily classify patient ﬁndings in terms
of the most likely diagnosis, would probably be over-
whelmed with the management of information and
inferences [2]. Expert physicians, on the other hand,
use relatively simple classiﬁcation schemata to reduce
the problem space of individual ﬁndings to one or a
small number of hypotheses that account for a cluster
of ﬁndings [42,77]. Without clinical knowledge as a basis
for classiﬁcation, knowledge of physiological mecha-
nisms and scientiﬁc principles would have to be used
to drive inferences and to associate observations; a task
that would be of enormous epistemological complexity.
The use of semantic methods of analysis provides a
means of identifying errors produced during the deploy-
ment of predictive and diagnostic reasoning. Two of
these errors are dependency eﬀects and cyclical infer-
ences. In dependency eﬀects, evidence from apparently
diﬀerent sources may seem to strengthen a hypothesis.
However, if these sources are dependent on some other
source, common to the previous sources, the hypothesis
would not be strengthened because what gives strength
to the hypothesis is the independence of evidence
sources. In cyclical inference, a hypothesis based on cer-
tain speciﬁc evidence is used to account for phenomena,
which include the evidence that originally gave rise to
the hypothesis. Since reasoning in the medical domain
involves both predictive and diagnostic strategies (i.e.,
reasoning from hypothesis to disease manifestations
and vice versa), there is the danger that, without a means
of keeping evidence from predictive and diagnostic
sources separate, cyclical inferences can occur. For
example, consider the reasoning given schematically in
Fig. 8. Intravenous drug used can lead to infection,
which leads to fever. In a patient with fever and heart
murmur, there is a possibility of endocarditis. In the caseof bacterial endocarditis, the disease is associated with
IV drug users; an association which was used to generate
the hypothesis of drug use in this case, resulting in circu-
lar reasoning, where each node in the reasoning chain
increases the certainty of the whole chain.
The problem of cyclical inferences arises as a result of
the failure to maintain a separation between the ﬂow of
predictive and diagnostic reasoning. If the knowledge
base of the clinician is adequate, diagnostic reasoning
may be preferred (e.g., through some form of pattern
matching). However, when the knowledge base of the
clinician is not suﬃcient (as it would be the case with
novices), a mixture of predictive and diagnostic reason-
ing is likely to be used. In this case, we may expect cycli-
cal inferencing. In general, any use of induction
(diagnosis) without an adequate basis for deduction
(prediction)—such as aﬀorded by well-developed classi-
ﬁcation frames—will likely lead to ineﬃcient, incom-
plete, and error-prone performance.
4.6. Understanding clinical guidelines with semantic
analysis
Semantic analyses have also been applied to the
investigation of clinical performance with the use of clin-
ical practice guidelines. Patel et al. [25,31] conducted
studies designed to characterize the cognitive processes
used by clinicians in the translation of a clinical guide-
line from text into an encoded form (using GLIF
[25,31]). Propositional and semantic analysis were used
on: (a) a written practice guideline (thyroid screening),
(b) an accompanying algorithm to the guideline (a deci-
sion ﬂowchart), and (c) the interpretation made by a
physician of the algorithm. By analyzing the text guide-
line, the algorithm, and the clinicians verbalizations of
the guideline, it was possible to identify gaps and incon-
sistencies in how the guideline was represented diagram-
matically and to determine the knowledge needed by the
clinicians to overcome such inconsistencies and ﬁll the
gaps left by the guideline. One main ﬁnding of this re-
search was that guidelines were shown to serve diﬀerent
purposes to the two groups of practitioners. General
practitioners used the guidelines to constrain their
search by deleting additional information, whereas ex-
pert physicians added information, which they normally
skip, unless reminded.
168 J.F. Arocha et al. / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 38 (2005) 154–1715. Conclusions and implications
In this paper, we show that the methods of proposi-
tional and semantic network analysis can be useful in
the investigation of the reasoning strategies used in med-
ical problem solving and decision making. We have pro-
vided examples that show the wide applicability of the
methods in various medical tasks. Also, we have suc-
cinctly described research in medical cognition demon-
strating the application of such methods to medical
informatics. We have also argued that the ontological
framework [19,27,44] serves as a relatively accurate repre-
sentation of the knowledge-in-use during clinical problem
solving by physicians and medical trainees, emphasizing
the importance of retrieval structure in expert diagnostic
reasoning. The research evidence bearing this out has
been accumulating over the years and has been reviewed
elsewhere [39,40]. We show how identiﬁcation of infer-
ences, strategies, and errors in reasoning are all possible
using these methods, as research has shown.
We suggest that a close connection can be made be-
tween these methods and those used in the development
of health ontologies, which has been heralded as one of
the major tasks of academic medical informatics [81]. As
Musen [82] rightly states, there are no correct ways to
deﬁne ontologies. However, given that the methods of
semantic analysis described and illustrated in this paper
provide a means for investigating clinicians actual rep-
resentation of patient problems in a particular domain,
it might be possible to develop medical ontologies that
match physicians cognitive representations. This may
shed light into ways in which such ontologies can be
modiﬁed to better organize clinical knowledge in ways
that are consistent to the actual use by clinicians.
Although this paper presents only a limited number
of examples of semantic analyses, these have shown
their usefulness in many medical tasks, including text
comprehension, clinical case recall, explanation of clini-
cal protocols, medical problem solving, and decision
making in a variety of health contexts. Moreover, these
methods have been extended to the investigation of
other forms of representation, as it has been done re-
cently in the case of the diagrammatic representation
of clinical practice guidelines [14,26,31].
Despite the successful use of these methods, some dis-
advantages have prevented their wider applications. A
main disadvantage of the methods is that its manual
application is very time consuming. To partially solve this
diﬃculty, attempts have been made to develop computer-
ized systems for conducting the analysis and for visually
representing its results. An early attempt was made that
allowed the online parsing and analysis of discourse
[83], to which semantic tags could be applied. Although
the system allowed the coder to proceed in amore system-
atic fashion as he or she analyzed the text, the analysis
was still not completely automatic. More recent attemptshave been made to emphasize diﬀerent aspects of propo-
sitional analysis and representation. In a study of clinical
problem solving during a telemedical consultation [84], a
semi-computerized system, which combined proposi-
tional analysis and Evans and Gadds ontology of medi-
cal knowledge model, was used to represent the
knowledge structures and solution processes deployed
by two physicians in a case of pyoderma gangrenosum.
The system allowed for the representation of the joint
problem solving process in a variety of formats, including
semantic networks and quantitative depiction of the solu-
tion process as a function of the time. A third, ongoing,
eﬀort to ease the analysis of cognitive knowledge struc-
tures using propositional analysis has been made at the
University of Victoria, Canada (http://hinf.uvic.ca/).
This attempt includes the development of a Web-based
tool that provides semantic categories and examples of
coding, with the aid of electronic lexical databases, such
as WordNet [85], and potentially, medical vocabularies.
These developments, although disparate, may prove use-
ful for what may be called cognitive medical informatics,
which may relate clinical tasks, the cognitive representa-
tions of such tasks by actual clinicians, and domain ontol-
ogies. Semantic methods of analysis, which have been
used successfully in understanding clinical reasoning in
the past 15 years, could contribute to such an eﬀort.Appendix A. Propositional analysis of the clinical case
description some of this can go in the text itself
1. A 62-year-old male lifted a box resulting in a
sudden onset of severe retrosternal chest pain
going through to the back.1.1 Lift AGT:male;OBJ:box;
1.2 Male ATT:63-year-old;
1.3 COND:(result) PAT:[1.1][1.4];
1.4 Pain ATT:severe,LOC:1.5,1.6;
1.5 Pain DUR:2-hour;
1.6 Chest PRT:(retosternal);
1.7 Radiate ACT:1.4,LOC:back;2 He felt a mild shortness of breath.
2.1 Feel PAT:he,THM:2.2;
2.2 Breath ATT:short;DEG:mild;
2.3 IDENT: [1.2],he;3. The pain persisted at rest and with movement.
3.1 Persist [1.4],[at rest];
3.2 Persist [1.4],[with movement];4. He had a long history of hypertension and also
had a myocardial infarction 5 years ago.4.1 Have PAT:he,ACT:hypertension;
4.2 Hypertension THM:history,DUR:_;
4.3 Have PAT:he,DAT:infarction;
4.4 Infarction LOC:(myocardium),
TEM:5-year;
Line missing
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shortness of breath on exertion.5.1 Have PAT:he,DAT:pain;
5.2 Pain ATT:recurrent,NEG;
5.2 Breath ATT:short,ACT:(on exertion),NEG;6. He had no previous surgery.
6.1 Have PAT:he,DAT:surgery,TEM:
(previous),NEG;7. On physical examination, his blood pressure
was 170/90.7.1 B.P. PAT:his,DEG:170/90;
7.2 (Take) [7.1],TEM:(on examination);8. His temperature was 37 C.
8.1 Temperature PAT;his,DEG:37 C;
8.2 (Take) [8.1],TEM:(on examination);9. His pulse was 110/min and his respiratory rate
was 30/min.9.1 Pulse PAT:his,DEG:110/min;
9.2 (Respiration) PAT:his,ATT:rate,DEG:30/min;
9.3 (Take) [9.2],TEM:(on examination);10. There were no abnormalities on physical
examination.10.1 Abnormalities (NUM:nill(no),ACT:other,TEM
(on examination));Appendix B. Physicians explanation of clinical case
description
1. We have a 62-year-old male who had a very
sudden onset of severe retrosternal chest pain
that radiated through his back while lifting a box.1.1 Male ATT:62-yr old;
1.2 Have PAT:Male,ACT:Chest_pain;
1.3 Chest_pain DEG:Severe;
1.4 Chest_pain PRT:(Rerosternal);
1.5 Chest_pain ATT:Sudden;
1.6 Radiate ACT:Chest_pain,LOC:Back;
1.7 Lift AGT:Male,OBJ:box;
1.8 COND: [1.7],[1.2];2. The pain was there for two hours and persisted
while the patient was moving or at rest.2.1 Chest_pain DUR:Two_hour;
2.2 Chest_pain PROX:At_rest;
2.3 Chest_pain PROX:With_movement;3. He has a history of hypertension and cardiac
problems, which suggests that this could be a
case of cardiovascular disease, such as ischemia,
either angina or even infarction.Line missing3.1 Have PAT:Male, THM:Hypertension;
3.2 Have PAT:Male, THM:
Cardiac_problem;
3.3 COND: [Hypertension_history],
[cardiovascular disease];
3.4 COND: [Cardiac_problem],
[cardiovascular disease];4. Hypertension makes me think also of aortic
dissection, especially with the pain radiating to
the back and the isometric eﬀort.4.1 COND: [Hypertension_history],
[Aortic_dissection];4.2 COND: [1.6], [Aortic_dissection];
4.3 COND: [Isometric_eﬀort],
[Aortic_dissection];
4.4 EQUIV: [1.7], [Isometric_eﬀort];5. If he had a small dissection, and he made this
eﬀort, this could raise his blood pressure and
that can cause aortic dissection.5.1 Have PAT:Male, ACT:Dissection,
MOD:QUAL: (If);5.2 Make AGT:Male, ACT:
Isometric_eﬀort;5.3 Raise [5.3], [Blood_pressure];
5.4 CAU: [5.2],[Aortic_dissection];6. The fact that the pain was so sudden and that
it was there with movement or at rest is very
consistent with aortic dissection, but makes
ischemia less likely.6.1 COND: [1.5],[Aortic_dissection];
6.2 COND: [2.2],[Aortic_dissection];
6.3 COND: [2.3],[Aortic_dissection];7. It could be musculoskeletal also but with the
history of hypertension and previous cardiac
problem, it is less likely.7.1 COND:NEG
(less likely)[Hypertension_history],
[Musculoskeletal];7.2 COND:NEG
(less likely)[Cardiac_problem],
[Musculoskeletal];8. On physical examination his blood pressure
was 170 over 90, his pulse was 110, so hes
tachycardic, his temperature was 37 C, and his
respiratory rate is 30 per minute.8.1 Blood_pressure DEG:170/90;
8.2 Pulse DEG:110;
8.3 Temperature DEG:37_degrees_C;
8.4 COND: [8.2],[Tachycardia];9. This suggests to me that there is something really
serious with this man and Im concerned with
bleeding somewhere.9.1 COND: [8.1,8.2,8.3],[Bleeding];Line missing
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aorta, with this presentation, and with that pain
radiating to the back musculoskeletal is less
likely right now.10.1 COND: [9.1],[Aortic_dissection];References
[1] Long WJ. Medical informatics: reasoning methods. Artif Intell
Med 2001;23:71–87.
[2] Patel VL, Ramoni M. Cognitive models of directional inference in
expert medical reasoning. In: Feltovich P, Ford K, Hoﬀman R,
editors. Expertise in context. Menlo Park, CA: AAAI Press/MIT
Press; 1997. p. 67–99.
[3] Ramoni M, Stafanell M, Magnani L, Barosi G. An epistemolog-
ical framework for medical knowledge based systems. IEEE Trans
Syst Man Cybernet 1990;22:1361–75.
[4] Elstein AS, Schwarz A. Clinical problem solving and diagnostic
decision making: selective review of the cognitive literature. Br
Med J 2002;324:729–32.
[5] Patel VL, Kaufman DR, Arocha JF. Emerging paradigms of
cognition in medical decision-making. J Biomed Inform
2002;35:52–75.
[6] Buckingham CD, Adams A. Classifying clinical decision making:
interpreting nursing intuition, heuristics and medical diagnosis. J
Adv Nurs 2000;32:990–8.
[7] Buckingham CD, Adams A. Classifying clinical decision making:
a unifying approach. J Adv Nurs 2000;32:981–9.
[8] Patel VL, Arocha JF, Kushniruk AW. Patients and physicians
understanding of health and biomedical concepts: relationship to
the design of EMR systems. J Biomed Inform 2002;35:8–16.
[9] Patel VL, Kaufman DR, Arocha JF. Conceptual change in the
biomedical and health sciences domain. In: Glaser R, editor.
Advances in instructional psychology: educational design and
cognitive science, vol. 5. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum; 2000. p. 329–92.
[10] Murﬀ HJ, Patel VL, Hripcsak G, Bates DW. Detecting adverse
events for patient safety research: a review of current methodol-
ogies. J Biomed Inform 2003;36:131–43.
[11] Zhang J, Patel VL, Johnson TR, Shortliﬀe EH. A cognitive
taxonomy of medical errors. J Biomed Inform 2004;37:193–204.
[12] Groves M, ORourke P, Alexander H. Clinical reasoning: the
relative contribution of identiﬁcation, interpretation and hypoth-
esis errors to misdiagnosis. Med Teach 2003;25:621–5.
[13] Coderre S, Mandin H, Harasym PH, Fick GH. Diagnostic
reasoning strategies and diagnostic success. Med Educ
2003;37:695–703.
[14] Patel VL, Arocha JF, Diermeier M, Greenes RA, Shortliﬀe EH.
Methods of cognitive analysis to support the design and evalu-
ation of biomedical systems: the case of clinical practice guide-
lines. J Biomed Inform 2001;34:52–66.
[15] Patel VL, Branch T, Arocha JF. Errors in interpreting quantities
as procedures: the case of pharmaceutical labels. Int J Med Inf
2002;65:193–211.
[16] Patel VL, Groen GJ. Knowledge-based solution strategies in
medical reasoning. Cognit Sci 1986;10:91–116.
[17] Joseph G-M, Patel VL. Domain knowledge and hypothesis
generation in diagnostic reasoning. Med Decis Making
1990;10:31–46.
[18] Patel VL, Groen GJ, Arocha JF. Medical expertise as a function
of task diﬃculty. Memory Cognit 1990;18:394–406.
[19] Patel VL, Evans DA, Groen GJ. Biomedical knowledge and
clinical reasoning. In: Evans DA, Ptel VL, editors. Cognitivescience in medicine: biomedical modeling. Cambridge, MA: The
MIT Press; 1989. p. 49–108.
[20] Patel VL, Groen GJ. Real versus artiﬁcial expertise: the develop-
ment of cognitive models of clinical reasoning. In: Stefanellii M,
Hasman A, Fieschi M, Talmon J, editors. Lecture notes in
medical informatics: proceedings of the third conference on
artiﬁcial intelligence in medicine. Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag;
1991. p. 25–37.
[21] Patel VL, Groen GJ, Ramoni MF, Kaufman DR. Machine depth
versus psychological depth: a lack of equivalence. In: Keravnou E,
editor. Deep models for medical knowledge engineering. North
Holland: Elsevier; 1992. p. 249–72.
[22] Patel VL, Frederiksen CH. Cognitive processes in comprehen-
sion and knowledge acquisition by medical students and
physicians. In: Schmidt HG, Volder MCD, editors. Tutorial in
problem-based learning. Assen, Holland: van Gorcum; 1984. p.
143–57.
[23] Groen GJ, Patel VL. The relationship between comprehension
and reasoning in medical expertise. In: Chi M, Glaser R, Farr M,
editors. The nature of expertise. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum; 1988. p.
287–310.
[24] Patel VL, Eisemon TO, Arocha JF. Comprehending instructions
for using pharmaceutical products in rural Kenya. Instruct Sci
1990;19:71–84.
[25] Patel VL, Allen VG, Arocha JF, Shortliﬀe EH. Representing
clinical guidelines in GLIF: individual and collaborative expertise.
J Am Med Inform Assoc 1998;5:467–83.
[26] Patel VL, Arocha JF, Diermeier M, How J, Mottur-Pilson C.
Cognitive psychological studies of representation and use of
clinical practice guidelines. Int J Med Inf 2001;63:147–67.
[27] Evans DA, Gadd CS. Managing coherence and context in medical
problem-solving discourse. In: Evans DA, Patel VL, editors.
Cognitive science in medicine: biomedical modeling. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press; 1989. p. 211–55.
[28] Anzai Y, Patel VL. Learning graph-reading skills for solving
problems. In: Evans DA, Patel VL, editors. Advanced models of
cognition for medical training and practice, NATO ASI Series F:
computer and systems, vol. 97. Heidelberg, Germany; 1992.
[29] Allen VG, Arocha JF, Patel VL. Evaluating evidence against
diagnostic hypotheses in clinical decision making by students,
residents and physicians. Int J Med Inform 1998;51:91–105.
[30] Leprohon J, Patel VL. Decision making strategies for telephone
triage in emergency medical services. Med Decis Making
1995;15:240–53.
[31] Patel VL, Branch T, Wang D, Peleg M, Boxwala A. Analysis of
the process of encoding guidelines: a comparison of GLIF2 and
GLIF3. Methods Inf Med 2002;41:105–13.
[32] Frederiksen CH. Learning to reason through discourse in a
problem-based learning group. Disc Process 1999;27:135–60.
[33] Frederiksen CH. Cognitive models and discourse analysis. In:
Cooper CR, Greenbaum S, editors. Written communication
annual: an international surveyof research and theory Vol 1:
Studying writing: linguistics approaches. Beverly Hills,
CA: Sage; 1986. p. 227–68.
[34] Clancey WJ, Shortliﬀe EH. Readings in medical artiﬁcial intel-
ligence: the ﬁrst decade. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley; 1984.
[35] Groen GJ, Patel VL. Medical problem-solving: some questionable
assumptions. Med Educ 1985;19:95–100.
[36] Chi MTH. Quantifying qualitative analyses of verbal data: a
practical guide. J Learn Sci 1997;6:271–315.
[37] Chi MTH. Self-explaining expository texts: the dual process of
generating inferences and repairing mental models. In: Glaser R,
editor. Advances in instructional psychology: educational design
and cognitive science. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum; 2000.
[38] Chi MTH, Bassok M, Lewis MW, Reiman P, Glaser R. Self-
explanations: how students study and use examples of learning to
solve problems. Cognit Sci 1989;13:145–82.
J.F. Arocha et al. / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 38 (2005) 154–171 171[39] Patel VL, Arocha JF. Cognitive models of clinical reasoning and
conceptual representation. Methods Inf Med 1995;34:47–56.
[40] Patel VL, Arocha JF. Methods of investigating clinical reasoning.
In: Higgs J, Jones M, editors. Clinical reasoning in the health
professions. Oxford, UK: Butterworth Heinemann; 2000. p.
35–48.
[41] Patel VL, Arocha JF. Introduction to the workshop on medical
education and training in the information age. Clin Invest Med
2000;23:251–5.
[42] Patel VL, Arocha JF, Kaufman DR. Diagnostic reasoning and
medical expertise. Psychol Learn Motiv 1994;31:187–252.
[43] Leon JA, Perez O. The inﬂuence of prior knowledge on the time
course of clinical diagnosis inferences: a comparison of experts
and novices. Discourse Proc 2001;31:187–213.
[44] Patel VL, Evans DA, Kaufman DR. Cognitive framework for
doctor–patient interaction. In: Evans DA, Patel VL, editors.
Cognitive science in medicine: biomedical modeling. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press; 1989. p. 253–308.
[45] Patel VL, Kaufman DR, Magder SA. The acquisition of medical
expertise in complex dynamic environments. In: Ericsson KA,
editor. The road to excellence: the acquisition of expert perfor-
mance in the arts and sciences, sports and games. Hillsdale,
NJ: Erlbaum; 1996. p. 127–65.
[46] Patel VL, Arocha JF, Kaufman DR. Expertise and tacit knowl-
edge in medicine. In: Sternberg RJ, Horvath JA, editors. Tacit
knowledge in professional practice: researcher and practitioner
perspectives. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum; 1999. p. 75–99.
[47] Patel VL, Arocha JF, Kaufman DR. Medical cognition. In:
Durso FT, editor. Handbook of applied cognition. New York,
NY: Wiley; 1999. p. 663–93.
[48] Doane SM, Mannes SM, Kintsch W, Polson PG. Modeling user
action planning: a comprehension based approach. User Model
User Adapted Interact 1992;2:249–85.
[49] Ericsson KA, Smith J. Prospects and limits of the empirical study
of expertise: an introduction. In: Ericsson KA, Smith J, editors.
Toward a general theory of expertise: prospects and limits. New
York, NY: Cambridge University Press; 1991. p. 1–38.
[50] Ericsson KA, Staszewski JJ. Skilled memory and expertise:
mechanisms of exceptional performance. In: Klahr D, Kotovsky
K, editors. Complex information processing: the impact of
Herbert A. Simon. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum; 1989. p. 235–67.
[51] Ericsson KA, Kintsch W. Long-term working memory. Psychol
Rev 1995;102:211–45.
[52] van Dijk TA, Kintsch W. Strategies of discourse comprehen-
sion. New York, NY: Academic Press; 1983.
[53] Arocha JF, Patel VL. Construction–integration theory and
clinical reasoning. In: Weaver III CA, Mannes S, Fletcher CR,
editors. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum; 1995. p. 359–82.
[54] Ericsson KA, Patel V, Kintsch W. How experts adaptations to
representative task demands account for the expertise eﬀect in
memory recall: comment on Vicente and Wang (1998). Psychol
Rev 2000;107:578–92.
[55] Kintsch W, Patel VL, Ericsson KA. The role of long-term
working memory in text comprehension. Psychologia
1999;42:186–98.
[56] Gatens-Robinson E. Clinical judgment and the rationality of the
human sciences. J Med Philos 1986;11:167–78.
[57] Mandin H, Jones A, Woloschuk W, Harasym P. Helping students
learn to think like experts when solving clinical problems. Acad
Med 1997;72:173–9.
[58] Musen MA, Tu SW, Das AK, Shahar Y. EON: a component-
based approach to automation of protocol-directed therapy. J Am
Med Inform Assoc 1996;3:367–88.
[59] Werner M. A model for medical decision making and problem
solving. Clin Chem 1995;41:1215–22.
[60] McGuire CH. Medical problem-solving: a critique of the litera-
ture. J Med Educ 1985;60:587–95.[61] Arocha JF, Patel VL, Patel YC. Hypothesis generation and the
coordination of theory and evidence in novice diagnostic reason-
ing. Med Decis Making 1993;13:198–211.
[62] Patel VL, Arocha JF, Glaser R. Cognition and expertise:
acquisition of medical competence. Clin Invest Med
2001;23:256–60.
[63] Arocha JF, Patel VL. Novice diagnostic reasoning in medicine:
accounting for clinical evidence. J Learn Sci 1995;4:355–84.
[64] Bovair S, Kieras DE. A guide to propositional analysis for
research on technical prose. In: Britton BK, Black JB, editors.
Understanding expository prose. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum; 1985.
p. 315–62.
[65] Frederiksen CH. Representing logical and semantic structure of
knowledge acquired from discourse. Cognit Psychol
1975;7:371–458.
[66] Kintsch W. Comprehension: a paradigm for cognition. New
York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press; 1998. p. 461.
[67] Glenberg AM, Robertson DA, Jansen JL, Johnson-Glenberg
MC. Not propositions. Cognit Syst Res 1999;1:19–33.
[68] Patel VL, Kaufman DR, Arocha JF. Steering through the murky
waters of a scientiﬁc conﬂict: situated and symbolic models of
clinical cognition. Artif Intell Med 1995;7:413–38.
[69] Rassinoux AM, Miller RA, Baud RH, Scherrer JR. Modeling
concepts in medicine for medical language understanding. Meth-
ods Inf Med 1998;37:361–72.
[70] Campbell KE, Musen MA. Representation of clinical data using
SNOMED III and conceptual graphs. Proc Annu Symp Comput
Appl Med Care 1992:354–8.
[71] Patel VL, Groen GJ. The general and speciﬁc nature of medical
expertise: a critical look. In: Ericsson A, Smith J, editors. Toward
a general theory of expertise: prospects and limits. New York,
NY: Cambridge University Press; 1991. p. 93–125.
[72] Buchanan BG, Shortliﬀe EH. Rule-based expert systems: the
MYCIN experiments of the Stanford heuristic programming
project. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley; 1984.
[73] Patel VL, Arocha JF, Kaufman DR. A primer on aspects of
cognition for medical informatics. J Am Med Inform Assoc
2001;8:324–43.
[74] Shortliﬀe EH, Davis R, Axline SG, Buchanan BG, Green CC,
Cohen SN. Computer-based consultations in clinical therapeutics:
explanation and rule acquisition capabilities of the MYCIN
system. Comput Biomed Res 1975;8:303–20.
[75] Patel VL, Groen GJ, Norman GR. Reasoning and instruction in
medical curricula. Cognit Instruct 1993;10:335–78.
[76] Winograd T. Understanding natural language. Cognit Psychol
1972;3:1–191.
[77] Coughlin LD, Patel VL. Processing of critical information by
physicians and medical students. J Med Educ 1987;62:818–28.
[78] Charness N. Expertise in chess and bridge. In: Klahr D, Kotovsky
K, editors. Complex information processing: the impact of
Herbert A Simon. Hillsdale, NJ, England: Erlbaum; 1989. p.
183–208.
[79] Chase WG, Simon HA. Perception in chess. Cognit Psychol
1973;4:55–81.
[80] deGroot AD. Thought and choice in chess. The Hague: Mouton;
1965.
[81] Musen MA. Medical informatics: searching for underlying
components. Methods Inf Med 2002;41:12–9.
[82] Musen MA. Scalable software architectures for decision support.
Methods Inf Med 1999;38:229–38.
[83] Groen G, Frederiksen C, Dillinger M. A propositional analysts
assistant. Behav Res Methods Instrum Comput 1984;16:154–7.
[84] Farand L, Lafrance J-P, Arocha JF. Collaborative problem
solving in telemedicine and evidence interpretation in a complex
clinical case. Int J Med Inf 1998;51:153–67.
[85] Lenat D, Miller G, Yokoi T. CYC, WordNet, and EDR: critiques
and responses. Commun ACM 1995;38:45–8.
